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Michael C. Munger
SELF-INTEREST AND PUBLIC INTEREST:
THE MOTIVATIONS OF POLITICAL ACTORS
ABSTRACT: Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics showed
that the public, politicians, and bureaucrats are often public spirited. But this does
not invalidate public-choice theory. Public-choice theory is an ideal type, not a
claim that self-interest explains all political behavior. Instead, public-choice theory
is useful in creating rules and institutions that guard against the worst case, which
would be universal self-interestedness in politics. In contrast, the public-interest
hypothesis is neither a comprehensive explanation of political behavior nor a sound
basis for institutional design.
Two decades ago, Leif Lewin published Self-Interest and Public Interest
in Western Politics (1991). The central question he raised was whether
the assumption that people are motivated exclusively, or even mostly, by
egoistic self-interest is plausible. His goal was not really to substitute
some other simplistic explanation of political action, but rather to
provoke the ‘‘rationalists’’ (as he calls them) to ‘‘set themselves to the
immensely more difficult task of finding out what causes the actual
behavior of a whole nation of people’’ (Lewin 1991, 17). The book
investigates whether it is plausible even to proceed ‘‘as if’’ voters,
politicians, and bureaucrats act primarily in their own self-interest.
Lewin’s book is surprisingly obscure, given its subject and ambition.
It has a cumulative total citation count1 of just over 100, fewer than six per
year since its publication. For my own part, I had never heard of Lewin or
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seen it referenced. By comparison, a book with similar ambitions and
some of the same message, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (Green and
Shapiro 1994),2 has over 1,600 citations in a shorter period.
Having now read Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics, and
having come to appreciate its contribution, I have a theory about
why it is relatively obscure. Green and Shapiro take a rather strange
scattershot approach to criticizing rational-choice theory. Their main
argument is that empirical testing has rarely been done, and the tests that
have been published tend not to support key claims of rational-choice
theorists.
This is a strange approach because Green and Shapiro repeatedly get
caught up hacking at trees, and ignore the forest. For example, they point
out a lack of empirical testing of the relation between turnout and
closeness of elections. If it had been tested, they note, those feckless
‘‘choicers would have discovered that elites appear to target resources on
close races, increasing turnout for strategic reasons rather than self-
interest reasons’’ (Green and Shapiro 1994, 63). In support of this claim
they cite an empirical paper: Cox and Munger 1989. Now, if Gary Cox
and I aren’t rational-choice theorists, then there aren’t any rational-
choice theorists. The point is that Green and Shapiro come quite close to
proving that rational-choice theorists do no empirical work by defining
rational-choice work as purely theoretical. Empirical tests, almost by
definition, are something else.
Thus Green and Shapiro spurred a furious and largely pointless
kerfuffle about what counted, or didn’t, as rational choice, and what
counted as an empirical test. Still, there were important questions posed in
the book, and the result was a considerable clarification of quite a few
issues. One important example was The Rational Choice Controversy:
Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (Friedman 1996), an edited volume
that asked both sides to take the problems raised in Green and Shapiro
more seriously, rather than being distracted by smaller issues. Friedman
(1996) cites Lewin (1991) at three points in his editor’s introduction,
‘‘Economic Approaches to Politics,’’ in the process chiding a reviewer
(Cain 1993) of the Lewin book for ducking the real question.
Michael Cain points out that Lewin ignores evidence from experi-
ments and published work in public choice clearly showing that people
are (at least sometimes) self-interested. Friedman points out, with
considerable justification, that Cain makes at least as big an error in
dismissing without consideration the evidence Lewin marshals, spanning
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a broad swath of time, national political culture, and behavioral settings,
which shows that people are (at least sometimes) public spirited.
That, it seems, is where we should start.
Self-Interest in Public-Choice Theory
The school of social science called ‘‘public choice’’ is identified by
a (loosely) shared approach to analyzing political or collective-choice
phenomena. The precepts of this approach include methodological
individualism, the attribution of self-interest as a motivation, and close
attention to the impact of institutions that aggregate and give expression
to individual actions as collective consequences.
Public-choice theory (hereafter, PCT) has focused on five key
problems:
1. Information: What incentives are provided for citizens in public-
choice processes to search out and acquire accurate information about
the policies, and the consequences of those policies?
2. Democratic coherence: How can collective-choice institutions be
designed to limit the possibility that voting outcomes will be perceived
as either arbitrary or imposed? Given the Condorcet-Arrow problem,
this problem bears on both the moral legitimacy of democratic choices
and the practical stability of democratic governments.
3. Constitutional scope: How can the power of majorities be limited to
the domain of choice selected by the constituting documents or
norms of the society? If majorities can decide speed limits, how can
majorities be prevented from choosing a state religion or making
decisions regarding the reproductive rights of women?
4. Collective action: How can institutions and societal norms be
designed, or preserved, in such a way as to encourage voluntary
contributions to the collective good? Free riding is a pathology
of anomic societies, but the tendencies for large democracies to
become anomic seems irresistible.
5. Rent seeking: How can destructive competitions for artificial prizes
such as tariff barriers or farm subsidies be limited or eliminated?
The answer that PCT offers to these questions takes the following,
conjectural form: What would happen if people were self-interested?
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This is quite different from saying that we will derive certain conclusions
that would follow only if people were self-interested*conclusions that
are invalid if people are not self-interested.
A famous example of this approach is that of David Mayhew (1974) in
Congress: The Electoral Connection. First, Mayhew gives a theoretical
answer to a relatively simple question: What would the institutions of the
U.S. Congress look like if members of Congress were single-minded
seekers of re-election? Second, Mayhew compares the answer to that
question with real world Congressional institutions.
What did he find? There are no important differences. The institutions
of Congress are indistinguishable from those implied by an intentionally
oversimplified behavioral assumption of narrow self-interest.
The organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs of
its members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down and
tried to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of
serving members’ electoral needs year in and year out, they would be hard
pressed to improve on what exists. (Mayhew 1974, 8182)
Does this mean that members of Congress are exclusively or even
primarily self-interested? Of course not. In fact, Mayhew is careful to list
a wide variety of goals and motivations that may be, and likely are,
at work. The point is that the simplifying assumption of self-interest
provides a counterfactual basis for making predictions about institutions.
This is precisely the kind of institutional analysis provided by James
Madison in Federalist 51, and for the same reasons:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to
control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence
on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
There it is again, then. We all know that people are not self-interested, and
in fact that they are capable of acts of courageous sacrifice and nobility.
342 Critical Review Vol. 23, No. 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ich
ae
l M
un
ge
r] 
at 
05
:03
 03
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
12
 
Imagine, then, that we could take the evidence offered by Lewin 1991
and travel back in time to talk to Madison about the design of the
Constitution.
‘‘Mr. Madison! We have evidence here that citizens, politicians,
and bureaucrats often act in the public interest. Don’t you think it would
be better to throw this whole ‘separation of powers’ nonsense out the
window?’’
He would stare at us with incredulity. ‘‘Did you not even read my
essay? The problem is not how people often act. The design of institutions
has to proceed on the assumption, which we all know is false, that people
sometimes act on their ambition, or what you guys in the future insist on
calling ‘self-interest.’ Only angels always act in the public interest, and
men are not angels. Now leave me alone; you are clearly not a serious
thinker.’’
It is quite common, even within the PCT pantheon, to admit that
the assumption of self-interest is at most one view among many. In fact
PCT is not that insistent that people are ‘‘self-interested,’’ since ‘‘goal-
oriented’’ or ‘‘purposive’’ would often be all that is meant. But for some
reason, critics insist on having an argument about a straw man.
The first point to be noted is that economic theory does not depend
for its validity or its applicability on the presence of the purely economic
man. This man of fiction, who is motivated solely by individual self-interest in
all aspects of his behavior, has always represented a caricature designed by those
who have sought to criticize rather than to appreciate the genuine contribution that
economic analysis can make, and has made, toward a better understanding
of organized human activity. (Buchanan and Tullock 1965, 16, emph.
added)
The reason that PCT scholars make this concession so easily is that the
exercise is ‘‘as if,’’ in just the way that Mayhew and Madison used the
self-interest assumption. Since no one believes it to be true, showing that
it is untrue seems like a fool’s errand. More importantly, even within
the ‘‘as-if’’ exercise itself, the domain of explained behavior, and the
predictions about behavior, are limited rather than universal.
It is also necessary to emphasize that [PCT] does not try to explain all human
behavior, even all of that which might be called ‘‘economic’’ in some normally
accepted sense of this term. At best, the theory explains only one important part of
human activity in this sphere. It examines one relationship among individuals in
isolation. . . . (Buchanan and Tullock 1965, 17, emph. added)
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It Takes Something to Beat Something
The sketch of PCT that I have given suggests that it is one basis
for theorizing, and that there are others. But that’s not really true. PCT
is quite single-minded in its insistence on narrow egoism. The empirical
‘‘tests’’ of the model often contrast this assumption against a straw man of
pure non-association or random behavior. But rather than testing
theoretical claims against a naı¨ve null hypothesis, why not test them
against a fully fleshed out alternative theory? In particular, why not
assume that people are public spirited?
There are two parts to the answer, it seems. First, PCT scholars have
devoted thousands of pages to the problems of morality and moral
motivations. In his 1975 book, Limits of Liberty, James Buchanan notes
that morals have two very different functions: They are where
preferences for future policies come from, but they are also the means
by which enforcement of past agreements is made possible. That is,
moral obligations help people keep their promises. But moral intuitions
shape the sorts of agreements people will try to make in the first place.
Thus, morals tell me what to want, and morals make me feel bad if
I violate agreements, even if in some sense my moral sense contradicts
my narrow self-interest.
Contractual obligation, expressed by the willingness of individuals to
behave in accordance with specified terms, depends critically on explicit
or imagined participation. Individuals, having ‘‘given their word,’’ are ‘‘honor
bound’’ to live up to the terms. This remains true even if, subsequent to agreement,
these terms come to be viewed as ‘‘unfair’’ or ‘‘unjust.’’ Defection or violation runs
counter to widely accepted moral codes for personal behavior. (Buchanan 1975, 96,
emph. added)
This view was further elaborated by Geoffrey Brennan and James
Buchanan in 1985, in a book called The Reason of Rules. This book tries
to settle the question of whether morals cause rules, or rules cause morals.
The answer is ‘‘yes.’’
The notion that rules may substitute for morals has been familiar to
economists and philosophers since at least Adam Smith. The great intel-
lectual discovery of the eighteenth century was that within an appropriate
structure of rules (‘‘laws and institutions,’’ in Smith’s3 phraseology),
individuals can further the interests of others by following their own
interests. The result is the great network of social coordination*refined
344 Critical Review Vol. 23, No. 3
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and extended to the boundaries of the division of labor*that even after
centuries defies the imagination when evaluated as a cooperative
enterprise. The cooperation of agents in a market, however, requires
neither that such agents understand the structure nor that they transcend
ordinary precepts of morality in their behavior. What it does require is an
appropriate ‘‘constitutional context’’*a proper structure of rules, along
with some arrangements for their enforcement.
It is easy to dismiss this insight as obvious, and it is perfectly true that
some PCT scholars have done just that. The problem is that Homo
economicus is a sociopath. No society, market or otherwise, could possibly
survive if every agreement were strategically evaluated at every moment.
Can I cheat? Will I get away with it? What about now? What about now?
We can’t seriously think that people are narrowly and permanently self-
interested, because the costs of enforcing agreements and constantly
guarding against fraud or theft would be overwhelming.
Some agreements are formally enforced, to be sure. But the structure
of agreements, buttressed in part by the threat of formal sanctions,
supported everywhere by a moral intuition that one should keep one’s
promises and obey the rules, is the foundation of capitalism. What
Brennan and Buchanan call ‘‘normal morality’’ is absent from the
formulation of the pure PCT model, but PCT cannot possibly operate
without it. It seems to me that this is point where Lewin’s argument is
strongest, because PCT itself assumes that people act in some kind of
public interest, if only in the Kantian sense of considering the harms that
would accrue to gains from selfishness.
Moral intuitions grow up around the rules and conventions of society
simply because those are the rules. Violating rules of behavior in an
exchange-and-production economy imposes very large costs on other
market participants. It might, in some sense, be ‘‘rational’’ for each
individual to break or stretch the rules at every opportunity. But rules
make this more costly through the threat of sanction, and make violations
more embarrassing because the citizen is breaking a promise that was
made, perhaps implicitly, to every other citizen. This ‘‘reason of rules’’
equilibrium can break down, of course, and it often does. But most
people, most of the time, accept the conditions and rules that shape and
direct their economic and political interactions. As Brennan and
Buchanan (1985, 101) point out, it is important for civil society that
‘‘‘we start from here,’ and not from someplace else.’’
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Suppose one were to take this criticism seriously, and wanted to try to
specify an alternative model that would then be tested directly against the
PCT self-interest model. There are two problems with such an attempt.
The first, honestly noted by Lewin (1991, 2122) himself, is that all too
often electoral researchers explain how people vote simply by asking
them who they like. In other words, it is not an explanation to run a
regression with ‘‘who did you vote for?’’ on the left hand side and
‘‘which candidate do you prefer?’’ on the right. The regressions come
out pretty well, of course, but it is hard to imagine a theory that claims
voters choose candidates they hate.
The second problem is that there are no other aggregation theories for
PCT to compete with. PCT is not trying to explain behavior; it is trying
to explain the observed form and function of institutions that aggregate
behaviors. Criticizing PCT for failing to explain behavior is a non
sequitur, unless the critic can show how an alternative model of
aggregation would perform better.
In this light, Dennis Chong (1996) mentions the ‘‘mysterious rivals’’
of PCT, arguing that one can’t criticize the assumptions unless one can
propose a different model. By the same token, Kenneth Shepsle (1995,
217) famously invoked the ‘‘first rule of wing-walking’’: ‘‘Don’t let go of
something until you have something else to hold on to.’’ Green and
Shapiro (1995, 256) responded that this would be more persuasive if
‘‘one could develop a degree of confidence that the aircraft in question
were indeed airborne.’’ The retort would only work if Green and
Shapiro, or for that matter Lewin, were themselves proposing some kind
of blueprint for a different way to fly. For PCT, at least there is an
airplane.
Rehabilitating Public Interestedness
In 1984 Gordon Tullock published a paper entitled ‘‘A (Partial)
Rehabilitation of the Public Interest Theory,’’4 in which he argues that
a very clear-cut (and traditional) reason why voters might be motivated to
put the public interest into their decision process is simply that most
people are, to some extent, charitable and interested in helping others.
This affects their voting behavior as well as their private behavior.
An individual who is trying to help others may do so, in part, by voting
346 Critical Review Vol. 23, No. 3
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for some public good, even if he doesn’t expect to benefit from it himself.
He may also choose to make charitable gifts through the government.
Tullock went on to argue that, although public interest might not
motivate all individual action, it probably should be seen as motivating
a lot of political action because a decision to vote for increased spending
on public goods, or aid to the poor, is virtually costless. Nonetheless,
it does cost something, and no explanation of voting behavior could
possibly be complete without accounting for this aspect of citizens’
motivations.
There are two problems, as Tullock sees it, with concluding that
public interest is the main goal of the typical citizen. The first is that the
desire to spend on private charity is limited. People give to charities, but
they don’t give everything to charities. In fact, it is rare that people give
more than five percent of their income in any given year.5
Second, even when people are motivated by the public interest, they
may lack the necessary information. So when they are presented with a
clear choice, as in the case of public goods (such as defense or education
spending), they may be able to vote in a way that advances their
sociotropic goals. But, as I will argue below, the information problem in
politics is different from the information problem in economics.
Still, surely Tullock’s article, in an obscure journal called Public Choice,
is some evidence that PCT scholars have long recognized the value of the
public interest in explaining public behavior. And I do mean that they
have ‘‘long’’ recognized it.
The first, and in some ways the most important, public-choice theorist
was Karl Marx. Marx had all of the key elements of public-choice theory
in his work: self-interested politicians and owners of capital, corrupt
institutions, and voters who would rather spend time on private activities
than think very much about what was happening to them politically.
The public-choice aspect of Marx is often glossed over, but it is
striking. As Marx and Engels ([1848] 1969) put it in the Manifesto: ‘‘The
executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the affairs
of the whole bourgeoisie. . . . The ruling ideas of each age have never
been the ideas of its [government].’’ George Stigler (1988, xv) built on
this claim:
[Public Choice] students of regulation have usually assumed, explicitly
as often as tacitly, that the players who count in regulation are the
producers and consumers. Political intermediaries*parties, legislators,
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administrators*are not believed to be devoid of influence, but in the
main they act as agents for the primary players in the construction and
administration of public policy.
Marx also believed that citizens are too distracted and mentally lazy to
have much control over government. Engels ([1893] 1975, 433) later
summarized this view succinctly:
Ideology is a process which is indeed accomplished consciously by the so-
called thinker, but it is the wrong kind of consciousness. The real motive
forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would
not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or apparent
motives.
Similarly, in his Public Choice landmark, An Economic Theory of Democracy
(1957, 83), Anthony Downs argues that
As soon as uncertainty appears, the clear path from taste structure to
voting decision becomes obscured by lack of knowledge. . . . [Some
voters] are highly uncertain about which party they prefer. They are not
sure what is happening to them, or what would happen to them if another
party were in power. They need more facts to establish a clear preference.
By providing these facts, [politicians] find an opportunity to become
effective.
[But political elites] are not interested per se in helping people who are
uncertain become less so; they want certainty to produce a decision which
aids their cause. Therefore they provide only those facts that are favorable
to whatever group they are supporting.
In short, PCT scholars not only admit, but openly assert that citizens
vote and act in the public interest, at least part of the time. The problems,
from Marx through Stigler to Downs, Tullock, and Buchanan, are that
it is hard for the individual citizen to overcome the power of organized
interest groups, and that it is difficult for the individual citizen to acquire
the information required to begin to do so.
Lewin (1991, 42) puts the point plainly: ‘‘In most [voter behavior]
studies a picture thus emerges of the voter as someone primarily guided
by a concern for the economy of the country as a whole.’’ The public-
choice theorist would respond, ‘‘Fair enough. But why would the average
citizen have any idea (a) of what is good for the economy as a whole, or
(b) whether any given politician who makes promises will actually do
348 Critical Review Vol. 23, No. 3
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those things?’’ For the ‘‘public interest’’ to matter for citizens, the
unformed impulse to do good is of little consequence unless the citizen
also has both advanced training in economics and some credible threat of
punishing politicians who act badly.
Thus, there are three parts to the PCT ‘‘citizen as private actor’’ story.
First, the citizen is motivated to seek his own self-interest. Second, the
citizen has limited information. Third, political elites know this, and use
advertising and simple slogans to attract votes.
The evidence that Lewin offers bears only on the first step. But if we
change the motivational assumption to its most extreme form*‘‘citizens
only want to act in the public interest’’*the cost of information, and the
value of simple political messages as persuasion, are unchanged. From
Marx to Downs to Buchanan and Tullock, the costliness of information
and of collective action has been a constant theme. Motivational
assumptions are nearly inconsequential for the public-choice theorist.
What matters are the aggregate consequences of individual action.
Do voters have the information they need to make accurate decisions?
The very political-psychology literature to which Lewin refers provides a
resounding ‘‘no’’ answer. Very few citizens are aware of even the most
basic political facts, and they have only cursory knowledge of how
government works (Page and Shapiro 1992, Table 1.2; Somin 1998). Less
than half can name their congressional representative, much less identify
her voting record or issue positions. Even fewer can give a coherent
attribution of their own political ideology in terms of its specific policy
implications (Converse [1964] 2006; Feldman and Conover 1982, 1983,
1984, and 1986). The rationally ignorant public-interest voter is
essentially indistinguishable from the rationally ignorant self-interest
voter.6 Rationality need not imply self-interest, but it clearly does, as an
empirical matter, imply that voters have very little idea of how policy
works and what candidates will do once they are in office.
For reasons I cannot understand, Lewin (1991, 107) denies this in
terms that can only be called naı¨ve:
While the proponents of the self-interest hypothesis centre their hopes
on setting satisfactory prices through market mechanisms, the representa-
tives of the public-interest hypothesis believe in cooperation as a method
to escape the ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma.’’ Both camps maintain that their
particular world*the market and politics, respectively*is the more
transparent, i.e. the one characterized by a minimum of unintended
consequences. Although this may be true of the way the market functions
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ideally as a model, however, faulty information, limits on competition,
and other imperfections are quite evident in real-life economies. Politics,
by contrast, because of its combination of collective organizations and
public debate, is probably easier to predict even in reality.
Yet public-choice scholars have never claimed that politics is unpredictable.
In fact, it is all too predictable, precisely because people can be counted upon
to act in their self-interest. A legislative se´ance of the sort Lewin envisions
for the public sector, groping toward some seraphic group wisdom, would
indeed be unpredictable, and (by his lights) not transparent. But the public-
choice argument is that one can project the decisions of a group with high
precision if one knows the goals of each individual and the decision rule that
will be used by the group.
Lewin argues for the superior competitiveness and informational
abundance of the public sector. I have already discussed the information
problem: Buying a car is a private good, and one has solid reasons to learn
about cars. Voting for a candidate is a public good, and information about
it will be underprovided by private action. The fact that voters have
public-interest intentions at the first stage, the motivation stage, is
essentially irrelevant, since they have private-interest reasons to free
ride and can thus be influenced by operatives whom Downs called
‘‘persuaders,’’ who have their own reasons to distort information. This
means, as Bryan Caplan (2007) has concluded, that the only hope for
sound public policy is through the intervention of credentialed experts in
bureaucratic agencies. What, though, about competition?
Political and Market Competition
Public-choice theorists have long claimed that the level of competition
in elections is far less than in the private sector. After all, Coke and Pepsi
might prefer that only two soft drinks are allowed, but they don’t get to
write their own antitrust laws. In the public sector, in the U.S. at any
rate, the Democrats and Republicans have engaged in extensive legal
machinations, particularly at the state level (Munger 2010), to save
themselves from having to deal with the inconvenience of new
competition.
A large PCT literature about the problem of ‘‘slack,’’ or ‘‘shirking,’’
strongly supports Lewin’s argument, although he does not cite it. A small
sample of this enormous literature published before 1990 includes Kau
350 Critical Review Vol. 23, No. 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ich
ae
l M
un
ge
r] 
at 
05
:03
 03
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
12
 
and Rubin 1979, Kalt and Zupan 1984, Peltzman 1985, Lott 1987, Nelson
and Silberberg 1987, and Dougan and Munger 1989. This body of work
argues that elected officials, instead of doing what voters want, do what
they themselves, the elected officials, want. It could be that the official is
acting according to his conscience, as Burke (1774) suggested one ought
to act. Or the official could be acting to benefit friends, contributors, or
ideological soul mates. In either case, politicians rarely try to maximize
votes. Instead, they maximize their own utility, including their personal
ideological view about the kind of society that should be imposed by law.
For some reason, Lewin does not consider maximizing utility to be in
the ‘‘self-interest’’ of the legislator. Voting the way I want to vote,
instead of the way voters want me to vote, hardly seems public spirited,
unless of course one believes that legislators know truths voters cannot
possibly understand. And in some ways that was the conclusion of the
previous section: Voters lack the information they need to make even
basic political choices, because voters are self-interested. As a result,
legislators are freed, and perhaps even obliged, to pursue their ideological
Weltanschauungen at voters’ expense. Because of the institutional
arrangements described by Mayhew (1974), elected officials in the
United States have no need to maximize their votes, and are free to vote
as they wish in many cases. Thus, Hibbs 1987 showed that the economic
policy pursued by Republicans and Democrats is very different. Even
representatives elected at different times from the same district or
senators from the same state act very differently, but consistently with
their ideological views (Dong and Munger 1989). That is self-interest
exercising power over the desires of citizens, even though the content of
the impulse has to do with ‘‘public’’ decisions like attacking Iraq or
restricting reproductive rights for women.
Bureaucrats
‘‘The government’’ employs, in most societies, a very large and diverse
cross-section of the population. Each of these individuals would probably
answer ‘‘yes’’ to the following two questions: (a) Would you like a higher
salary? (b) Could you do a better job delivering needed services if the
particular office or branch that you work in had a larger budget? If we
were to administer this short questionnaire to 10,000 randomly selected
bureaucrats in the capital of any democratic nation, I can’t imagine that
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more than 500, and maybe not that many, would answer ‘‘no’’ to even
one of the two questions.7 Since each of the two actions would require
a larger budget, surely we can agree that individual bureaucrats would by
and large prefer larger budgets. I’m not sure what ‘‘maximizing’’ means in
an atmosphere of profound uncertainty about political actions, but each of
these employee wants more, not less.
Whether this desire for ‘‘more’’ is self-interested is a complicated
question, of course. As William A. Niskanen (1971, 39) points out:
The budget maximization assumption is not necessarily based on a cynical
interpretation of the personal motivations of bureaucrats. Some bureau-
crats, by either predisposition or indoctrination, undoubtedly try to serve
(their perception of) the public interest. A bureaucrat, however, is neither
omniscient nor sovereign. He cannot acquire all of the information on
individual preference and production opportunities that would be
necessary to divine the public interest, and he does not have the authority
to order an action that is contrary to either the personal interests or
the different perceptions of the public interest by some other bureaucrats
or officers of the collective organization. . . . This leads even the most
selfless bureaucrats to choose some feasible, lower-level goal, and this
usually leads to developing expertise in some narrow field. The
development of expertise usually generates a sense of dedication, and it
is understandable that many bureaucrats identify this dedication with the
public interest. . . . One should not be too surprised . . . to hear that the
most dedicated bureaucrats describe their objective as maximizing the
budget for the particular service(s) for which they are responsible.
Lewin (1991, 97) claims that ‘‘the budget-maximization hypothesis is
not sustained by empirical research.’’ But he misunderstands, in a way so
willful that it could almost be said he misrepresents, the argument that
Niskanen is making. In particular, Lewin (ibid., 9296) cites evidence
that bureaucrats are constrained by what politicians tell them to do, and
infers from this that bureaucrats are not ‘‘maximizing.’’ But Niskanen,
and the public-choice theorists who follow him, are quite clear that the
process is one of constrained maximization. The steps in the PCT
version of bureaucratic budget maximization go as follows:
1. For reasons of personal benefit and honest perceptions of public
benefit, bureaucrats seek to increase the level of services they provide
the public. If I can get more budget, my pay goes up, I get a nicer
office, and I can provide better schools/more help to farmers/more
help to the homeless/etc.
352 Critical Review Vol. 23, No. 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ich
ae
l M
un
ge
r] 
at 
05
:03
 03
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
12
 
2. The system of oversight is based on a stylized farce. The politicians
charged with oversight are those who care most about the service
being provided. Thus, agriculture bureaucracies are overseen by
legislators from farm districts; public-housing bureaucracies are over-
seen by legislators from urban districts, and so on. The legislators
and bureaucrats both want larger budgets and more services for
the bureaucracy. So it is not necessary for the bureaucrat to hoodwink
the oversight authority in any way: The oversight authority and
the agency both want to increase the agency’s budget. The only
constraint is the maximum agency budget that will be acceptable to
the legislature as a whole and to the executive.
3. Legislators who are not high demanders of the service might object to
the increased budget, but they have little accurate information either
about service provision or how budgets are actually used. This
information is controlled by the ‘‘iron triangle’’ of the government
agency, its beneficiaries, and its legislative supporters.
4. Since it is so difficult for outsiders to influence this cozy relationship,
a universalistic log roll is constructed whereby each legislator is able to
obtain for his constituents those services they most value. If I don’t
object to your budget increase, you won’t object to mine, and both
agencies can grow. I might prefer that my agency grow and yours
shrink, since I don’t value your agency’s services. But I need to
construct a coalition that guarantees that my agency gets the budget it
needs to serve my constituents.
Nothing here requires that either the bureaucrat or the legislator
is being cynical. Both may genuinely believe that an increased budget in
the narrow area they care about really does serve the public interest. The
point is that budget maximization is the result, even if it is not necessarily a
selfish motivation, of the actions of everyone in the process.
As regards both voters and politicians, the evidence Lewin cites
is relevant, although I have argued that his interpretation of PCT should
be updated. But in the case of bureaucracy, Lewin fundamentally
misrepresents the essentials of the argument. He ‘‘disproves’’ the claim
that bureaucrats control the budget process and the legislature is powerless
to stop them*a claim that no one has ever made. Moreover, there is a
substantial literature (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Weingast 1983 and
1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987) arguing that oversight
authorities are, if anything, even more powerful than Niskanen thought
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in being able to increase agency budgets yet retain control over agency
actions.
Has government spending increased over time? In particular, has there
been an increase in spending after controlling for inflation and population
growth? Table 1 gives the answer for the United States, the country
Niskanen (1971) was primarily considering.
As the table shows, there has been a 224 percent increase in U.S.
federal spending per person, controlling for inflation, since 1970. It is
perfectly possible that this is what voters wanted, of course. But it is also
true that there has been a doubling, or more, of the budgets of the federal
agencies that administer and supervise these programs. The evidence,
far from contradicting the budget-increase hypothesis, seems quite
consistent with it.
* * *
It is unfortunate that Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Democracies
got so little attention. Lewin’s empirical evidence regarding the motiva-
tions of voters and politicians is perfectly valid and important, even if it
would have been more effective if he had connected it to the PCT
scholarship, cited above, that supported his claims.
The problem was, and remains, that it takes a model to beat a model.
PCT has set out an agenda and an approach to understanding politics.
The predictions of parts of that model have been proven false. But to
date no alternative model, based on more verisimilar assumptions about
the motivations of the mass electorate or political elites, has been
proposed. Instead, electoral survey researchers have been satisfied to
critique the assumptions of PCT, and have been satisfied to show that
these assumptions are, at best, not a complete account of political action
Table 1. U.S. Nominal and Real Federal Spending Per Capita
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Nominal dollars 1,000 2,600 5,100 6,500 12,300
Inflation-adjusted
(2010) dollars
5,500 6,800 8,300 8,300 12,300
Sources: Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables 3.2 and 7.1; Statistical
Abstract of the United States.
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and culture. And PCT scholars have been able to dismiss the objections
without really engaging with the issues raised by Lewin’s critique. His
book is still worth reading, and still worth taking seriously.
NOTES
1. And this count of 117 is using the relatively generous measure of Google Scholar,
which counts syllabi and web references. Using the more accurate measure of
Web of Science/SSCI*which counts only published references in professional
journals*the total is an anemic 55 citations.
2. For what it is worth, Green and Shapiro (1994) do not even reference Lewin
(1991) anywhere in their book. The journal Public Choice at least had the good
sense to review the book (Cain 1993), though perhaps predictably the review was
not very positive.
3. Smith ([1776] 1994, 82): ‘‘That full complement of riches, which the nature of its
laws and institutions permits it to acquire.’’
4. I have noted that it seems unfair that Green and Shapiro (1994) did not cite Lewin
(1991). But then Lewin did not cite Tullock (1984), so there may be karmic
justice at work.
5. See, for example, Brooks (2006, ch. 3 and 4), which notes that an extremely
important determinant of whether, and how much, is donated is the answer to
the question ‘‘caring for the poor is primarily the job of the government.’’ People
who answer ‘‘yes’’ are much less likely to make charitable donations, and if they
do give, they give smaller amounts.
6. This literature is huge, and I will not pretend to review it here. Three issues of
Critical Review (vol. 12, no. 4; vol. 18, nos. 13, and vol. 20, no. 4) were devoted
entirely to this topic.
7. I have some qualifications to make this judgment, having myself worked in
bureaucracies ranging from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission to administrative
jobs in both state and private universities. No one thinks they make too much
money, no one.
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